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Paul C. Giannelli 
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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Jayant Haksar 
Class of 1996, C.WR.U. Law School 
This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term. 
CONFESSIONS 
Miranda 
In Stansbury v. California, 114 U.S. 1526 (1994), the 
police were looking for the murderer of a 1 0-year old girl. 
A witness had observed a turquoise car near the location 
where the body had been found. Other information indicat-
ed that the girl had spoken to two different ice cream truck 
drivers. Stansbury was one. Initially, however, the other 
driver was the leading suspect. When the police arrived at 
Stansbury's house, they told him that they were investigat-
ing a homicide and that he was a possible witness. He 
voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the police station. 
The investigating detective interviewed Stansbury without 
first reading Miranda warnings. During the inter~iew, 
Stansbury mentioned that he had returned home after work 
and left his trailer about midnight in his housemate's 
turquoise car. When Stansbury admitted to prior convictions 
for rape, kidnaping, and child molestation, the detective 
terminated the interview and advised him of his Miranda 
rights. 
Stansbury moved to suppress the statements made to 
the detective prior to the Miranda warnings. The trial court 
ruled that Stansbury was not in custody until he mentioned 
the turquoise car. At that point the detective had "focused" 
on him as the assailant. The California Supreme Court 
affirmed, agreeing that "custody" occurred when the detec-
tive focused on Stansbury once the turquoise car was men-
tioned. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Miranda 
warnings are required only ~hen a suspect is subjected to 
custodial interrogation. The term "custody" is defined as a 
''formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Whether the officer 
''focused" on the suspect is not relevant, unless the officer's 
subjective view is communicated to the suspect: "It is well 
settled, then, that a police officer's subjective view that the 
individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, 
does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in 
custody for purposes of Miranda:' Stansbury, 114 S. Ct. at 
1529-30. 
The custody issue is determined by an objective test: 
Would a reasonable person believe, based on all the cir-
cumstances, that she was under arrest or its equivalent? If 
the officer's subjective views are communicated to the sus-
pect, that fact along with other factors is reievant to deter-
mining "custody:' Even, then, the communication is not 
determinative: "Even a clear statement from an officer that 
the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in 
itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects 
are free to come and go until the police decide to make an 
arrest:' /d. at 1530. A police officer's statement that the 
suspect is under arrest is different; such a statement consti-
tutes "custody:' 
The objective test cuts against the police in some circum-
stances. For example, an officer's view that a person is not 
a suspect is also not determinative. Such a subjective view 
would not matter if the person's freedom had been restricted 
to such a degree that the person was in effect under arrest. 
Waiver of Right to Counsel 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme 
Court held that once a suspect asserts the right to counsel 
after receiving Miranda warnings, the police must cease 
questioning until counsel is made available or the suspect 
reintiates the conversation. In Davis v. United States, 55 
Grim. L. Rep. 2206 (1994), a suspect waived the right to 
remain silent and right to counsel when first questioned 
about a murder. An hour and half into the interview, Davis 
said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer:' At this point, the 
investigators asked Davis if he wanted an attorney present. 
He said that he was not asking for an attorney and then 
added: "No, I don't want a lawyer:' The interview then con-
tinued for another hour. Finally, Davis commented: "I think I 
want a lawyer before I say anything else:· The interrogation 
ceased. At trial, Davis moved to suppress his statements. 
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The lower courts had adopted three different approaches 
when the police are faced with an ambiguous comment 
concerning counsel. First, some courts had ruled that any 
comment about counsel, not matter how ambiguous, 
requires the cessation of questioning. Second, other courts 
had attempted to define a threshold standard; comments 
falling short of this threshold did not qualify as an invocation 
of the right to counsel. Third, still other courts had adopted 
a "stop and clarify'' approach. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled Davis' statements 
admissible. The Court rejected all these approaches for 
one more favorable to the police. The Court held that the 
Edwards rule applies only when a suspect "unambiguously'' 
requests counsel. The opinion goes on to note: 
Although the suspect need not 'speak with the dis-
crimination of an Oxford don,' ... he must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 
understand the statement to be a request for an attor-
ney. If the statement fails to meet the required level of 
clarity, Edwards does not require the officers to stop 
questioning the suspect. /d. 
The Court recognized that its requirement of "a clear 
assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some 
suspects who - because of fear, intimidation, lack of lin-
guistic skills, or a variety of other reasons - will not clearly 
articul::~tA thAir rinht to counsel althouah they actually want 
to ha~~-~ i~;y~r"'present." ld The primary protection for 
these suspects, however, is the Miranda warnings them-
selves. If the suspect waives the right to counsel after 
receiving the warnings, the police may question that sus-
pect. Edwards provides an extra safeguard, but only if the 
suspect makes an unambiguous request for an attorney. 
The "need for effective law enforcemenf' requires a bright 
line rule for the police. 
While the Court indicated that a "stop and clarify" rule 
would often be "good police practice;' such a rule is not 
constitutionally required. 
Federal Statute 
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599 (1994), 
involved an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501. During a 
search of the defendant's residence, local police officers 
discovered narcotics and counterfeit Federal Reserve 
Notes. The defendant was arrested on state narcotics 
charges. Three days later, while the defendant was still in 
custody, Secret Service agents interviewed him. The defen-
dant waived his Miranda rights and admitted that the Notes 
were counterfeit. He was then arrested on federal charges 
and presented on the federal complaint. · 
The defendant argued that the three-day delay between 
his arrest on state charges and his presentment on federal 
charges violated § 3501 (c) and therefore rendered the con-
fession inadmissible. Congress had adopted § 3501 to 
modify the "McNabb-Mallory'' rule, which was based on 
Federal Criminal Rule 5(a). That rule required the prompt 
("without unnecessary delay") presentment of persons 
arrested for federal crimes before a magistrate or state 
judge. The Supreme Court had held in McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 
354 U.S. 449 (1957), that confessions obtained during an 
unnecessary delay are generally inadmissible. Congress 
altered this rule when it adopted§ 3501. Subsection (c) 
provides that confessions obtained within six hours of arrest 
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shall not be inadmissible solely because of a delay in pre-
senting the accused before the magistrate. 
The issue that had divided the courts concerned the inter-
val after the six hour "safe harbor" period. Some courts had 
ruled that confessions obtained after the six-hour interval 
were automatically inadmissible. Noting that the statute 
was silent about the post six-hour time frame, other courts 
had ruled that a delay was only one factor in determining 
the voluntariness of a confession made in this time frame. 
The Supreme Court dodged this issue by ruling that the 
statute did not apply when a person is arrested on statt:t 
charges. The statute comes into play only when a person is 
arrested on federal charges. In this case, the defendant 
had confessed before he was arrested for the federal crime. 
The Court did acknowledge that a different issue would 
be raised if the defendant could show that federal and state 
law enforcement officers colluded by having state police · 
arrest a person for questioning by federal officers. In a 
1943 case, the Court had held that a confession obtained in 
this way was inadmissible. Anderson v. United States, 318 
U.S. 350 (1943). This exception, however, did not apply in 
Alvarez-Sanchez because there was no evidence of a collu-
sive arrangement. 
The Court also acknowledged that state police officers 
often are authorized to arrest on federal charges, in which 
case § 3501 applies: "If a person is arrested and held on a 
federal charae by 'any' law enforcement officer- federal, 
state, or local --that· person is under 'arrest or other deten-
tion' for purposes of §3501 (c) and its 6-hour safe harbor 
period:' Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S.Ct. at 1604. 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The Court returned once again to the constitutionality of 
peremptory challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), the Court had ruled that the Equal Protection 
Clause governs the exercise of peremptory challenges by a 
prosecutor in a criminal case. An accused has "the right to 
be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to 
nondiscriminatory criteria:• /d. at 85-86. In a series of later 
cases, the Court extended this ruling to civil cases, 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), 
and to the defense, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 
(1992). 
These cases, however, involved racial discrimination, and 
the issue of whether the Batson rationale extended to gen-
der had divided the lower courts. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 
rei. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994), the Supreme Court 
answered that question in the affirmative. The case 
involved a paternity and child support action. The State 
used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, 
and the defendant used all but one of his strikes to remove 
female jurors. As a result, all jurors were female. 
The Court had addressed the gender-jury issue in Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), where the Court had 
ruled that the systematic exclusion of females from the jury 
pool violated the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section 
requirement: "Restricting jury service to only special groups 
or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the 
community cannot be squared with the constitutional con-
cept of jury trial:' /d. at 530. The Court, however, had never 
applied the fair cross-section requirement to the actual jury 
selected. As long as females and racial minorities were not 
excluded from the jury pool, the petit jury seated in a partic-
ular case need not reflect racial or gender diversity. 
Unlike Taylor, however, Batson was based on equal pro-
tection grounds; it held that the use of peremptories to 
exclude racial minorities violated the 14th Amendment. In 
other contexts involving gender-based classifications, the 
·~ Court had held that an exceedingly persuasive justification 
was required to survive equal protection scrutiny. The Court 
had little trouble extending Batson to gender discrimination. 
The State attempted to justify its exclusion of males on 
the rationale that men would be more sympathetic than 
women to a male paternity defendant. This made the 
Court's decision easy: "We shall not accept as a defense to 
gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype 
the law condemns."' J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1426. 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
In Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (1994), the Court 
reviewed two cases involving jury instructions on the 
"beyond a reasonable doubf' standard. Although due 
process requires the prosecution to prove the essential ele-
ments of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
does not require that any particular words be used to con-
vey this standard - so long as ''taken as a whole, the 
instructions correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable 
doubt." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). 
The Court has also commented that "[a]ttempts to explain 
the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it 
any clearer to the minds of the jury." Miles v. United States, 
103 U.S. 304,312 (1881). See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 
430, 440-41 (1887) (''The rule may be, and often is, ren-
dered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to cre-
ate doubts instead of removing them:'). 
~ In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), the Court ruled 
r a jury instruction unconstitutional that included the following 
· passages: (1) "It must be such doubt as would give rise to 
, a grave uncertainty:• (2) "It is an actual substantial doubt:' 
· {3) "What is required is not an absolute or mathematical 
certainty, but a moral certainty:' According to the Court, 
these passages watered-down the constitutional standard. 
The Court wrote: 
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and 
"grave:' as they are commonly understood, suggest a 
higher degree of doubt than that is required for acquit-
tal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those 
statements are then considered with the references to 
"moral certainty:· rather than evidentiary certainty, it 
becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have inter-
preted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on 
a degree of proof below that required by the Due 
Process Clause. /d. at 41 . 
California Instruction 
One of the cases before the Court involved a California 
instruction. The defendant challenged several passages: "It 
is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt:' Another passage used 
the phrase "moral certainty:• Chief Justice Shaw's instruction 
, in a 19th Century case was the genesis of this instruction. 
': Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850). The 
. defendant challenged the terms "moral certainty" and "moral 
evidence:' When Webster was decided in 1850, those terms 
had specific meanings, which were often equated with proof 
, beyond a reasonable doubt. The question was whether a 
. , 20th Century jury would understand 19th Century terms. 
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The Court found the term "moral evidence" unproblematic 
because it was explained in the instruction. The jury was 
told to decide the case on the trial evidence and not from 
any other source. They were also informed that evidence 
consisted of the testimony of witnesses, writings, material 
objects, and anything offered to prove a fact. 
The term "moral certainty" was more troublesome. The 
Court was willing to concede that the term, standing alone, 
"might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym 
for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 
1247. Nevertheless, the instruction as a whole sufficiently 
informed the jury of the constitutional requirement. In par-
ticular, the Court rejected the notion that the term was defi-
cient because it cast the standard in terms of probabilities. 
The Court noted that ''the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard is itself probabilistic:· /d. Accordingly, the "problem is 
not that moral certainty may be understood in terms of 
probability, but that a jury might understand the phrase to 
mean something less than the very high level of probability 
required by the Constitution in criminal cases:· /d. 
The instruction noted that the jurors had to have an "abid-
ing conviction, to a moral certainty:· This explanation, plus 
the remainder of the charge, satisfied the constitutional 
standard. The Court also commented that it did 
not condone the use of the phrases. As modern dictio-
nary definitions of moral certainty attest, the common 
meaning of the phrase has changed since it \vas used 
in the Webster instructions, and it may continue to do so 
to the point it conflicts with the [constitutional] standard. 
/d. at 1248. 
Nebraska Instruction 
The companion case, from Nebraska, contained the fol-
lowing contested passages: "You may find an accused 
guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided 
such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt 
of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an 
actual and substantial doubt arising from the evidence ... 
as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, 
from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture:· 
The defendant argued that the phrase "beyond a substan-
tial doubf' created a lower standard than "beyond a reason-
able doubt:• Here, again, the Court found the phrase 
"somewhat problematic" but nevertheless upheld the convic-
tion. Other parts of the instruction provided an alternative 
definition: a reasonable doubt is one that would cause a 
reasonable person to hesitate to act. This formulation had 
been approved repeatedly by the Court. See Holland, 348 
U.S. at 140. 
INSANITY DEFENSE 
Shannon v. United States, 55 Grim. L. Rep. 2213 (1994), 
raised a question concerning the Insanity Defense Reform 
Act of 1 984, the federal statute passed by Congress after 
the acquittal of John Hinckley for the attempted assassina-
tion of President Reagan. Shannon argued that the Act 
required an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of 
"not guilty by reason of insanity [NGI]." He also argued that 
such an instruction, if not required by the Act, should be 
mandated under the common law because jurors may erro-
neously believe that a defendant found·NGI will be immedi-
ately released into society. 
The Act, for the first time, created a comprehensive pro-
cedure for dealing with the insanity defense in federal 
courts. Congress (1) changed the substantive test for 
insanity, (2) required the accused to establish insanity by 
clear and convincing evidence, (3) recognized a special ver-
dict of "not guilty by reason of insanity;' and (4) created a 
comprehensive civil commitment procedure. 
The Supreme Court ruled that an instruction on the con-
sequences of a NGI verdict is not required. Nothing in the 
Act requires the instruction. Nor did the Court believe that 
the instruction should be adopted under its supervisory 
authority. Providing jurors sentencing information "invites 
them to ponder matters that are not within their province, 
distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and cre-
ates a strong possibility of confusion:· /d. at 2215. In other 
context, the courts presume that the jury will follow its 
instructions. Finally, such an instruction may prove counter-
productive. The only "consequence" that is clear is the 
requirement of a "dangerousness" hearing within forty days. 
"Instead of encouraging a juror to return an NGI verdict, as 
Shannon predicts, such information might have the opposite 
effect - that is, a juror might vote to convict in order to 
eliminate the possibility that a dangerous defendant could 
be released after 40 days or less:· /d. at 2217. 
The Court, however, recognized a limited exception: "If, 
for example, a witness or prosecutor states in the presence 
of the jury that a particular defendant would 'go free' if found 
NG!, it may be necessary for the district court to intervene 
with an instruction to counter such a misstatement:• /d. 
SENTENCING: UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS 
In Nichols v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1921 (1994), the 
Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing court may use a 
defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, 
where no prison term was imposed, "to enhance punish-
ment at a subsequent conviction:' /d. at 1928. This holding 
overruled Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
Nichols pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, he 
had amassed three criminal history points for a 1983 felony 
drug conviction. He was assessed another point for a 1983 
state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influ-
ence (DUI); he was not represented by counsel and 
received only a fine for this offense. This additional point 
raised Nichols' Criminal History Category to category Ill and 
resulted in a maximum sentence, which was 25 months 
longer than it would have been had the misdemeanor not 
been included. The Supreme Court affirmed Nichols' con-
viction. 
Nichols argued that the use of the uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction violated the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as construed in Baldasar. The right to counsel 
applies in misdemeanor cases only if actual incarceration is 
imposed. Scott v.lllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Ba/dasarthe Court ruled 
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be 
used to enhance punishment, even though constitutionally 
valid, because no incarceration was imposed. This result 
was somewhat anomalous; a constitutionally valid convic-
tion could not be used for sentencing. 
In Nichols, the Court overruled Baldasar, noting that sen-
tencing procedures have traditionally been "recognized as 
less exacting than the process of establishing guilt:' 
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927. Indeed, sentencing courts have 
not only taken into consideration a defendant's prior convic-
tions "but have also considered a defendant's past criminal 
behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior:' 
/d. at 1928. The constitutionality of considering such previ-
ous conduct is well-established. See Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241 (1949); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 '~j 
(1986). Thus, a sentencing court could constitutionally 
enhance Nichols' sentence based on evidence of the previ-
ous DUI offense, even without a conviction. If this is so,· 
then it must be "constitutionally permissible to consider a 
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the 
same conduct where that conduct must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt:' Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1928. 
The Court summarized its holding as follows: 
[W]e hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no 
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to 
enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction. /d. 
This ruling is not limited to federal sentencing. It also 
applies to state sentencing, including recidivist statutes. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
In Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 
S.Ct. 1937 (1994), the Supreme Court held that Montana's 
Dangerous Drug Tax Act violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because it permitted double punishment for the 
same. conduct. 
The Act imposed a tax "on the possession and storage of ' 
dangerous drugs:· The tax was to be "collected only after 
any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied:' 
However, taxpayers must file a return within 72 hours of 
their arrest. There is no obligation to file a return until an ~ 
arrest is made. 
The Kurths were convicted for cultivating marijuana on 
their ranch and for possession of hashish oil and drug para- i 
phernalia. Two members of the Kurth family received prison 
sentences, while four received suspended or deferred sen-
tences. The Department of Revenue additionally sought 
$900,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties on the marijuana 
plants. The Kurths subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy and alleged that the tax violated double jeopardy 
principles. The bankruptcy judge agreed, as did the district 
court, which concluded that the Act "simply punishes the 
Kurths a second time for the same criminal conduct:' The 
Court of Appeals affirmed but refused to hold the tax facial-
ly unconstitutional. The Montana Supreme Court reached a i 
different conclusion in other cases. The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve these inconsistent deci-
sions. 
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced for 65 separate 
violations of the criminal false claims statute. In each 
instance, he had claimed $12 for $3 services. In a subse-
quent civil proceeding, a $2,000 penalty for each false claim 
was authorized. The Supreme Court found the resulting 
$130,000 penalty double punishment, rejecting the argu-
ment that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to crim-
inal proceedings. In the Court's view, a legislatively desig-
nated "civil penalty" could violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Although Halper did not involve a tax, the Court stated that 
"a tax is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply 
because it is a tax:· Kurth, 114 S.Ct. at 1946. 
Generally, the unlawfulness of an activity does not pre-
vent its taxation. A drug tax could be collected if the tax-
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payer had not been previously punished, or if it was 
imposed in the criminal proceeding. The inquiry focused on 
whether the Montana statute was punishment disguised as 
· . a tax. The Act did not function as a tax because its primary 
~ goal was to punish and deter certain behavior rather than 
to collect revenue ·and because it "is conditioned on the 
commission of a crime:· /d. at 1947. The Court distin-
guished the Act from legitimate taxes, such as those on 
tobacco, by noting that the justifications for that type of tax, 
such as 
creating employment, satisfying consumer demand, and 
providing tax revenues, were not present in this instance. 
DETAINERS 
In Reed v. Farley, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994), the Supreme 
Court decided that a state court's failure to observe the 
12D-day rule of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers [lAD] 
is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus when the defen-
dant did not object to the trial date at the time it was set and 
suffered no prejudice. 
Indiana took custody of Reed pursuant to the lAD, which 
requires that a prisoner be tried within 120 days of arrival in 
the receiving jurisdiction or else the charges are dismissed 
with prejudice. However, the lAD does allow for extensions 
upon a showing of "good cause:· The trial judge, unaware 
of the 120-day limit, scheduled Reed's trial for a date that 
was after the tollinq period. Reed never obiected to the trial 
date until after the 120-day limit had expired.' The state courts 
refused to grant him relief on the grounds that Reed should 
have objected prior to the tolling date and because they 
believed that he was aware of the violation prior to the tolling. 
: Although the lAD is a voluntary interstate agreement, it is 
· also a law of the United States subject to habeas review. 
The Supreme Court's precedent had held that the lAD "is a 
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the 
Compact Clause, US Canst, Art I, § 10, cl 3, and thus is a 
federal law subject to federal construction:· Carchman v. 
Hash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). Moreover, "habeas review is 
available to check violations of federal laws when the error 
qualifies as 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in 
a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsis-
tent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure:" 
Reed, 129 L. Ed.2d at 288, citing Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424, 428 (1962); accord United States v. Timmreck, 
441 U.S. 780 (1979); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 
(1974). This was not, however, such a case: 
When a defendant obscures Article IV(c)'s time pre-
scription and avoids clear objection until the clock has 
run, cause for collateral review scarcely exists. An 
unwitting judicial slip of the kind involved. here ranks 
with the nonconstitutionallapses we have held not cog-
nizable in .a post-conviction proceeding. /d. at 288-89. 
The Court also rejected Reed's argument that the 54-day 
delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, 
especially in light of the fact that Reed sought an extension 
during those 54 days to better prepare his defense. 
Additionally, "[a] showing of prejudice is required to estab-
lish a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial . 
Clause, and that necessary ingredient is entirely missing 
here." /d. at 291. 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Instruction on Prior Death Sentence 
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S.Ct. 2004 (1994), the 
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Court upheld the admission of evidence regarding 
Romano's death sentence from an earlier case during the 
sentencing phase of his murder trial. 
Romano was separately tried and convicted for two capi-
tal murders. The death sentence was imposed in the first 
trial (Thompson). During the sentencing phase of the sec-
ond trial (Sarfaty), the state offerea evidence of the earlier 
death sentence to show that Romano was a violent felon 
and would be a continuing threat to society. These factors 
were aggravating_ circumstances under the Oklahoma death 
penalty law. The second jury also imposed the death sen-
tence. Romano objected, claiming that the evidence of his 
first death sentence diminished the jury's sense of responsi-
bility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985). The Supreme Court disagreed. 
In Caldwell, the jury was misled and its sense of respon-
sibility undermined when the prosecutor and the trial judge 
told the jurors not to view themselves as sentencing a man 
to death because a death sentence would be appealed and 
re-examined by the state supreme court. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that these remarks "precluded the jury from 
properly performing its responsibility to make an individual-
ized determination of the appropriateness of the death 
penalty." /d. at 330-31. The Court subsequently narrowed 
the holding of Caldwell: ''To establish a Caldwell violation, a 
defendant must necessarily show that the remarks to the 
jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by 
local law:• Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); see 
also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
The Romano Court found that the evidence did not "con-
travene the principle established in Caldwell" because the 
jury was not misled as to its responsibility in the sentencing 
phase: ''The evidence at issue was neither false at the time 
it was admitted, nor did it even pertain to the jury's role in 
the sentencing process. The trial court's instructions, more-
over, emphasized the importance of the jury's role:· 
Romano, 114 S.Ct. at 2011 . That the evidence was irrele-
vant as a matter of state law did not render its admission 
federal constitutional error. 
The Court also rejected Romano's request that it ''fashion 
general evidentiary rules, under the guise of the Eighth 
Amendment, which would govern the admissibility of evi-
dence at capital sentencing proceedings:· /d. at 2011. 
Romano argued that the introduction of irrelevant evidence 
(the death sentence) rendered his sentencing "unreliable" 
and therefore violative of the Eight Amendment. However, 
the Court held that since the irrelevant evidence was not 
prejudicial, and because the jury instructions were proper, 
there was no Eighth Amendment violation. The Court fur-
ther declined to create evidentiary rules: "We have not 
done so in the past ... and will not do so today:· /d. 
Nor did this evidence violate the Due Process Clause. 
The standard of due process review in capital cases is 
whether the remarks "so infected the trial with unfairness as 
to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process:· 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 ( 1 97 4). The 
Romano Court held that since the jury could just as easily 
have been influenced not to impose the death sentence by 
the -remarks, there was no violation of due proc.ess. 
Jury Instruction on Parole Ineligibility 
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 129 L..Ed.2d 133 (1994), 
the Supreme Court ruled that where a state seeks the 
death penalty based on the defendant's ''future dangerous-
ness" and state law prohibits release on parole, due 
process requires that the jury be informed that the accused 
is ineligible for parole. 
Simmons, who was convicted of beating an elderly 
woman to death, had recently pleaded guilty to multiple 
counts of burglary and sexual assault (all involving elderly 
women). These convictions rendered him parole ineligible if 
convicted of another violent crime. During sentencing, the 
state sought the death penalty based upon the aggravating 
circumstance that Simmons posed a future danger to soci-
ety. The defendant attempted to counter this point by argu-
ing that he was a danger only to elderly women whom he 
was not likely to meet in prison. When the jury asked if the 
imposition of a life sentence included a possibility of parole, 
the trial judge instructed it to consider life imprisonment in 
its "plain and ordinary meaning:' The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, finding a due process violation. 
"Future dangerousness" is a legitimate factor of jury con-
sideration in a capital murder trial. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262 (1976); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). 
Nevertheless, "a person may not be executed 'on the basis 
of information which he had no opportunity to deny or 
explain' because due process guarantees a defendant the 
right to rebut or explain aggravating factors alleged by the 
prosecution:' Simmons, 129 L. Ed.2d at 143. 
The Court wrote that "there may be no greater assurance 
of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public 
than the fact that he never will be released on parole:' /d. at 
142. The Court further noted that "[a]n instruction directing 
juries that life imprisonment should be understood in its 
'plain and ordinary' meaning does nothing to dispel the mis-
understanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in 
which any particular State defines 'life imprisonment':· /d. at 
146. Consequently, "[t]he trial court's refusal to apprise the 
jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determina-
tion, particularly when the prosecution alluded to the defen-
dant's future dangerousness in its argument to the jury, 
cannot be reconciled with our well-established precedents 
interpreting the Due Process Clause:' /d. at 142-43. 
Vagueness of Aggravating Factors 
In Tuilaepa v. California, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994), the 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that 
California's sentencing factors are unconstitutionally vague. 
In order to sentence a defendant to death in California, 
the trier of fact must return a first degree murder verdict and 
also find one or more of 19 special circumstances enumer-
ated in the California death penalty statute. Then, in the 
penalty phase, numerous other factors must be considered. 
While robbing a bar, Tuilaepa shot and killed Melvin 
Whiddon. He was convicted of first degree murder with 
the special circumstance of murder while committing a 
robbery. During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the 
jury to consider various factors but did not provide a method 
or standard for weighing and evaluating any of them. 
Tuilaepa argued that the following factors were unduly 
vague: (1) the circumstances of the crime, (2) whether the 
defendant had a previous history of violent crime, and (3) 
the defendant's age at the time of the crime. 
Capital punishment jurisprudence addresses two different 
aspects of the decisionmaking process: (1) the eligibility 
decision and (2) the selection decision. The eligibility issue 
deals with whether the defendant's crime is such that the 
death penalty is a proportionate punishment. Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Accordingly, a capital defen-
dant must be convicted of murder with a finding of at least 
one aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty 
phase. However, the aggravating circumstance may not be 
unconstitutionally vague. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 
420 (1980) (Georgia aggravating circumstance that offense 
''was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in 
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated 
battery to the victim" held to be unconstitutionally vague in a 
murder case). 
In the sentencing phase, the trier of fact decides whether 
to impose a death sentence on a defendant who may legal-
ly be executed. Of particular importance in this phase is 
"an individualized determination on the basis of the charac-
ter of the individual and the circumstances of the crime:' 
Tuilaepa, 129 L.Ed.2d at 760, citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 879 (1983). Indeed, the sentencing phase adds a 
subjective perspective to the objective view taken in the eli-
gibility proceeding. 
A vague circumstance may threaten the neutrality of the 
sentencing process and encourage bias and arbitrary deci-
sion: "A vague propositional factor used in the sentencing 
decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the 
mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process 
prohibited by Furman v. Georgia." /d. at 761. However, a 
factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "common-sense 
core of meaning ... that criminal juries should be capable of 
understanding:' Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (White, 
J., concurring). 
Tuilaepa did not challenge the eligibility requirements for 
imposition of the death sentence. Rather, he argued that 
the circumstances of the crime, his prior criminal history, 
and his age at the time of commission are unconstitutionally 
vague factors. The Supreme Court disagreed: "The cir-
cumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consid-
eration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the 
circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper 
under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence:' Tuilaepa, 129 
L.Ed.2d at 762. Similarly, the defendant's prior history of 
violent crime is important in deciding capital punishment. 
This factor was not vague because it asked jurors to review 
tangible and ascertainable "matters of historical fact." ld. 
The Court used the same rationale to explain that age is a 
relevant and tangible factor to be considered by a jury. See 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
Finally, the Court rejected Tuilaepa's argument that the 
instructions were deficient because no basis for weighing 
these factors was provided. Jurors need not be instructed 
on how to evaluate facts in a capital sentencing decision. 
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008-09 n.22 (1983) 
("the fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how 
the commutation factor is to figure into its determination 
presents no constitutional problem:'). Once the defendant 
is eligible for the death penalty, it is within the discretion of 
the sentencer to decide what factors are determinative of a 
death sentence: the "sentencer may be given unbridled dis-
cretion in determining whether the death penalty should be 
imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member 
of the class made eligible for that penalty." Tuilaepa, 129 
L.Ed.2d at 764, citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 875. 
Double Jeopardy 
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783 (1994), raised a double 
jeopardy issue in the context of a death penalty proceeding. 
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. the same victim): (1) knowingly killing, (2) killing while 
, committing rape, and (3) killing while committing sexually 
' deviate behavior. He did not contest the killing but argued 
.I insanity or guilty but mentally ill. These choices, plus lesser 
included offenses, gave the jury ten possible verdict options. 
The jury found Schiro guilty of "killing while committing 
rape" and made no findings on the other verdict options. 
At the sentencing phase, the state sought capital punish-
ment based on the aggravating factor that Schiro had 
committed an intentional murder while committing rape. 
The jury recommended against capital punishment in light 
, of mitigating evidence. However, in Indiana, the court is not 
' bound by the jury's recommendation, and the judge 
, imposed the death penalty. 
· Schiro argued that the jury's failure to convict on the first 
count ("knowingly killing") operated as an acquittal of inten-
tional murder and therefore could not be used as an aggra-
vating factor. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this double 
jeopardy argument. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second 
prosecution after initial acquittal or conviction and also 
against multiple punishments. North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969). Schiro argued that the sentencing 
phase of his prosecution should have been considered as a 
successive prosecution after the jury recommendation was 
rejected. The Court disagreed, citing Stroud v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), in which the Court had held that 
a defendant couid be resentenced after retriai when his 
original murder conviction had been overturned on appeal. 
Also, a second sentencing hearing may be held when the 
initial hearing was improperly based. Lockhart v. Nelson, 
488 U.S. 33 (1988). The Court noted "[i]f a second sentenc-
ing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the double 
jeopardy clause, we fail to see how an initial sentencing 
proceeding could do so:· Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 789. 
The Court also distinguished Bullington v. Missouri, 
451 U.S. 430 (1981 ). Bullington was convicted of capital 
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murder, but the jury refused to impose the death penalty . 
When his conviction was overturned, he was retried and the 
state again sought the death penalty. As a general rule, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a harsher 
penalty on retrial following a successful appeal. Bullington, 
however, recognized a limited exception in capital cases -
the first jury's failure to impose the death penalty is consid-
ered an acquittal on that issue. Nevertheless, Bullington 
was not controlling because the "State did not reprosecute 
Schiro for intentional murder, nor did it force him to submit 
to a second death penalty hearing. It simply conducted 
a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single 
prosecution:· Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790. 
Schiro also argued that the state was "collaterally 
estopped" from seeking the death sentence since the jury 
had "acquitted" him of the "intentional murder" aggravating 
circumstance. The collateral estoppel doctrine, however, 
requires the defendant to "demonstrate that the issue 
whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually 
decided in the first proceeding:' Dowling v. United States, 
493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (defendant did not meet his bur-
den because there was more than one basis on which the 
jury could have reached its conclusion). In this case, the 
jury could very well have believed that it could only return 
one verdict, especially since each side made this point 
during closing arguments. Additionally, the instructions did 
not "differentiate between the two ways of proving 'murder' 
under Indiana law" and ''the jury verdict did not necessarily 
depend upon a finding that Schiro lacked an intent to kill:' 
Finally, the Court noted that even Schiro's attorney seemed 
to believe that intent was not an issue since he never 
argued that Schiro lacked the intent to kill: "In view of 
Schiro's confession to the killing, the instruction requiring 
the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to 
whether the jury believed it could return more than one 
verdict, we find that Schiro has not met his [burden] ... :· 
Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792. 
